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drop in aggregate TFP through misallocation during the Great Recession. I build a
quantitative model with heterogeneous establishments; with the help of the model
I compute the counterfactual drop in misallocation: by how much would aggregate
TFP have decreased if the credit crunch had been absent. I nd that a "real
recession" would have caused a drop of only 0.16 percent, as opposed to 1.04 percent
found in the data; therefore nancial frictions account for a signicant part of the
drop in aggregate TFP. The key mechanism is the following: the increase in the
cost of external nance a¤ects negatively the reallocation of productive inputs from
low to high productivity rms, by dampening the growth of small-highly productive
rms.
JEL: D21, D22; E32; G31
Keywords: nancing constraints, misallocation, heterogeneous rms, incomplete
markets, idiosyncratic shocks.
Address: Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, 78457 Konstanz - Ger-
many. E-mail address: alessandro.di-nola@uni-konstanz.de. Personal webpage:
https://sites.google.com/site/alessandrodinolaphd. I am greatly indebted to my super-
visor Nicola Pavoni for his guidance and patience. I thank Francois Gourio, Luigi Iovino, Leo Kaas,
Georgi Kocharkov, Marco Ma¤ezzoli, Tommaso Monacelli, Frank Portier, Fabiano Schivardi, Almuth
Scholl and seminar participants at the Edge Conference in Copenhagen 2014, the Applied Economics
Workshop in Petralia Sottana 2014 and the Bocconi macro lunch workshop for helpful comments and
suggestions. I thank Matthias Messner for helpful discussions about the theoretical model of this paper.
All remaining errors are mine.
1
1 Introduction
The Great Recession di¤ers from other recessions that happened in the US during the
post-war period in terms of both severity and persistence. It has been also characterized
by a drop in aggregate TFP and reallocation of unprecedented amount (see Foster et al.,
2014). What distinguishes the Great Recession is the disruption in nancial markets;
it is well understood that households were severely a¤ected by the tightening in credit
conditions, but also rms were badly hit: the credit spread between BB and AA corpor-
ate bonds, though typically countercyclical, increased much more in the 2007-2009 crisis
than in past recessions. If we look at the heterogeneity in nancing between rms, it
is well documented that the corporate sector as a whole has become a net lender over
the recent two decades. Two stylized facts are of paramount importance: the increasing
trend in cash holdings by the US corporate sector and the fact that in the aggregate the
average rm is able to nance its capital expenditures by internal cash ows. However
by looking at disaggregated micro-level data one notices that small and highly productive
rms are typically cash constrained: they need to raise external nance for growing up
their scale of operations. It is palusible that credit tightening, of the amount seen in
the credit recessions, a¤ected more these small and young rms that are more protable
than others. Indeed the measured change in total factor productivity observed during the
Great Recession can reect an increased distortion in the allocation of capital between
rms, where di¢ culty in obtaining credit a¤ects more the growth of more productive but
smaller rms.
In this work I document that a signicant portion of the measured drop in TFP
observed during the Great Recession can be attributed to nancial conditions that disrupt
the allocation of capital further from that implied by rm productivities. Following the
approach of Olley and Pakes (1996), I decompose aggregate productivity in the economy
into a technological component and into a second term dened as the covariance between
rm size and rm productivity. This second component captures the allocative e¢ ciency
in the distribution of production factors between rms with heterogeneous productivity
levels. I show that in the Compustat sample roughly 53 percent of the drop in TFP
that occurred between the peak (2007:Q1) and the trough (2009:Q2) of the recession
is accounted for by a decrease in allocative e¢ ciency. Forthermore, exploiting the time
coverage of the Compustat sample, I document that excluding the last two recessions
the reallocation in output shares between rms, though still an important driver of TFP
uctuations, accounts for a much lower fraction of TFP changes. Therefore the Great
Recession stands out because it witnessed an unprecedented decline in the covariance
between rm size (measured by rms output share) and rm productivity. It is therefore
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legitimate to consider recessions, and in particular the last episode, times of increased
misallocation of resources between heterogeneous production units, rather than times of
negative technological shocks.
The aim of this paper is to use an o¤-the-shelves model of heterogeneous plants with
credit market imperfections to quantify the contribution of nancial disruption to the
dynamics of capital misallocation during the Great Recession. Financial market imperfec-
tions are introduced as an external cost function capturing the basic notion that external
funds are more costly than internal cash ows. While most of the literature studying the
impact of nancial frictions on rmsinvestment focus on debt nancing (see for example
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 or Khan and Thomas, 2013), I explicitely allow for equity n-
ancing as well. Considering only debt can be a problem: if rms can avoid a tightening
of frictions in debt nancing by replacing debt with equity nance, then models that only
allow for debt nancing could overstate the importance of nancial frictions. Moreover,
Fama and French (2005) document that equity issuances are quantitatively important in
the Compustat sample. A possible concern regarding my modelling choice is that I do
not focus on debt and equity separately but I consider their sum, so that in my model
debt and equity are perfect subsitutes. Covas and Haan (2011) document that at least for
rms up to the 99th percentile of the size distribution both debt and equity issuances are
procyclical, suggesting that during recessions rms nd it more di¢ cult to raise external
nance in either form. Therefore focusing on external nance as the sum between equity
and debt nancing is not a relevant loss of generality for my purposes.
I use the model (calibrated to the pre-2007 period) to answer the following question:
"By how much would misallocation have changed during the recession if borrowing costs
had stayed constant to the pre-recession average?". In other words, with the help of the
model, I can compute the counterfactual scenario of a recession driven by a productivity
shock only, and assess the contribution of the change in nancial frictions to the amount of
allocative e¢ ciency. To answer the question: "What is the contribution of costly external
nance to the fall in misallocation"? I study the transitional path of the economy between
two steady states (SS1 and SS2 from here on). The parameters in the initial steady
state SS1 are calibrated to match cross-sectional moments of rm distribution in the pre-
recession period 1980-2007. I use the Compustat dataset (a large panel of listed rms for
the US) to calibrate my model so that is able to reproduce most of the fall in aggregate
total factor productivity and misallocation observed from data. More precisely I perform
two quantitative exercises: in the baseline I compute the transition between SS1 and SS2,
using as inputs a deterministic path of aggregate TFP shocks (calibrated to match the
observed drop in GDP) and the change in the parameters of the external cost function.
In the counterfactual, I compute the transition between SS1 and SS2, using as inputs the
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deterministic path of aggregate TFP shocks but keeping the parameters in the external
cost function xed at the pre-recession period values. Using such counterfactual scenario I
can answer the following question: "What would have been the fall in capital reallocation
between rms if the degree of nancial frictions had stayed constant at its pre-recession
value?".
In order to highlight the mechanism though which nancial frictions a¤ect productiv-
ity, it is better to present the ow of funds equation for rms in my model:
d =  (k; z)  I   AC + e
where d denotes dividends,  is operating cash ow, I is investment, AC stands for
physical adjustment costs and e stands for external nancing. Dividends and external
nance cannot be negative by denition. The ow of funds constraint simply states that
if rm nancing needs for capital expenditures (i.e. I+AC) exceed the cash ow generated
internally then the rm has to raise additional funds by tapping the nancial market (i.e.
has to choose e > 0). Issuing new shares or borrowing however is costly: the rm pays a
xed cost 0 plus a variable cost 1. Financial frictions in the model therefore act through
this channel: an increase in the cost of raising external nance reduces the share of rms
raising external funds. But rms raising external funds are more productive than the rest,
as I show in the following part.
Using the Compustat panel, I sort rms according to their nance regimes:
1. Dividends distribution regime (d > 0 & e = 0)
2. Financial inactivity regime (d = 0 & e = 0)
3. External nance regime1 (d = 0 & e > 0)
Notice, however, that about 20 percent of rms in this sample both raise external
nance and distribute dividends. This behavior is puzzling given standard corporate
nance theory, since it implies that there are protable opportunities to reduce dividends
and equity issuance or debt (remember that in my model, as it is standard in the literature,
the cost of external funds is larger than internal funds). I decided to group these rms
into the dividend distribution regime (for sure they are not liquidity constrained).
For any year (1980-2007) I compute some statistics for rms in each nance regime.
Table 1 summarizes my ndings.
1I consider that a rm is not raising external nance if the ratio between internal funds and capital
expenditues is between 0.95 and 1.05. Perturbing this threshold does not change my results signicantly.
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1980-2007 External Finance Fin. Inactive Div.distrib.
Share of rms 0.23 0.297 0.474
Share of cap 0.028 0.059 0.913
Share of invest 0.039 0.057 0.904
Earnings/cap 0.567 0.275 0.355
Invest/cap 0.29 0.193 0.194
Tobins q 3.76 1.78 2.83
Table 1: Distribution of Firms across Finance Regimes in the Data (Average over 1980-
2007).
Table 1 reveals that about half of the rms pay dividends. Firms paying dividends
account for a large share of capital and investment in the sample, they are more productive
than liquidity constrained rms but less productive than rms raising external nance.
Firms raising external funds are much more productive than the rest, as measured by
the earnings-capital ratio. These small rms (measured by capital) with high Tobins q
require external nance to nance investments. Higher costs of raising external funds
during the crisis a¤ected most these "growth rms".
2 Literature Review
The present work lies at the intersection between two strands of literature: the empirical
literature about TFP growth and reallocation and the theoretical literature about dynamic
general equilibrium models with heterogeneous rms and nancial frictions.
On the empirical side the growing availability of longitudinal rm-level data has al-
lowed the analysis of reallocation across individual producers and the connection of this
reallocation to aggregate productivity growth. Representative work in this area includes
Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Foster et al. (2001). A common theme of these
studies is to decompose aggregate productivity growth into several parts to characterize
the contributions of within plant productivity growth and reallocation, where the latter
includes the contribution of reallocation among continuing establishments and the impact
of entry and exit. Despite that their ndings vary with the specic data sets and decom-
position methodologies used, a uniform nding in these studies is an important role of
reallocation in accounting for aggregate productivity growth in the U.S. manufacturing.
For instance, Foster et al. (2001) document that reallocation accounts for about half of
overall total factor productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing for the period 1977 to 1987.
All these empirical studies use the sum of output (or employment) weighted rm/plant
level TFP (or labor productivity) to measure the aggregate productivity of an industry.
According to Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) the denition of aggregate productivity
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is as follows. Suppose the production function for plant i in period t is:
yit = f (kit; lit;mit)
= kkit l
L
it m
M
it
where k; l;m are capital, labor and intermediate inputs, respectively. Then establishment
level TFP is computed as:
log TFPit = log yit   k log kit   l log lit   m logmit (1)
where k, l and m are return to scale factors for capital, labor and intermediate inputs.
Finally aggregate productivity in period t (at the sector level) is dened as:
TFPt =
X
i
!itTFPit (2)
where !it is the output (or labor) weight of plant i in the sector. In this work, in order
to measure reallocation of productive inputs I look at the time variation of a measure
of allocative e¢ ciency originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), hereafter OP. OP
noticed that aggregate productivity at a given point in time (as dened, for example, in
2) can be decomposed as follows:
TFPt =
1
Nt
X
i
TFPit +
X
i
 
TFPit   TFP t

(!it   !t) (3)
where TFPit is rm level productivity, !it is the share of output (or labor) of the rm,
Nt is the total mass of active rms, and a bar over a variable indicates the unweighted
average of the rm-level measure. This OP decomposition splits the aggregate productiv-
ity TFPt, dened as the weighted average of rm-level productivity, into an unweighted
rm-level average and a covariance term. The covariance term is a summary measure of
the within-industry cross-sectional covariance between size and productivity: it is expec-
ted that in a well-functioning market economy such covariance is positive, i.e. rms with
higher than average productivity have a larger than average size. A low covariance indic-
ates then that aggregate productivity could improve by reallocating resources towards the
most productive rms. This analysis of allocative e¢ ciency by using OP decomposition
in (3) has been performed in quite a few studies. In the seminal contribution of Olley
and Pakes (1996), the authors found that the covariance term increased substantially in
the US telecommunications equipment industry following the deregulation of the sector
in the early 1980s. OP argued that this was because the deregulation permitted inputs
to be reallocated more readily from less to more productive US rms. In a subsequent
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study, Bartelsman et al. (2013) found that the OP covariance term for labor productiv-
ity averages about 50 log points within US manufacturing industries: this implies that
the industry index of labor productivity in the average US manufacturing industry is 50
percent higher than it would be if employment shares were randomly allocated within
industries. Bartelsman and his coauthors found however that the OP covariance term
reaches only 20-30 log points in Western Europe and it was close to zero, if not negat-
ive, in Central and Eastern European countries at the beginning of their transition to a
market economy. They documented also that in Central and Eastern European countries
the covariance term increased substantially in the 1990s as their transition to a market
economy progressed.
On the theoretical side there are several studies that analyse an economy with het-
erogeneous production units, noting that aggregate TFP depends not only on the TFPs
of the individual rms but also on how inputs are allocated across rms. These papers
focus on distortions in product, labor or credit market and policies that can all slow down
aggregate productivity growth by hindering the reallocation process among heterogen-
eous producers. A seminal contribution in this eld is Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993):
using the Hopenhayn (1992) model of rm dynamics they quantify the aggregate TFP
loss due to ring costs. A non-exhaustive list of more recent works comprises Buera and
Shin (2013), Buera et al. (2013), Guner et al. (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Restuc-
cia and Rogerson (2008) and Midrigan and Xu (2014). Much of this literature however
emphasizes the role of frictions and policies in the cross-country di¤erence in long-run
TFP and, therefore, abstracts from the cyclical dynamics of misallocation. For example,
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) build on the key insight that misallocation can result as lower
aggregate TFP and using data on manufacturing try to measure the extent of misalloc-
ation in China and India compared to US (they need US as a control group that takes
into account model misspecication and measurement error). They interpret the gap
in marginal revenue product of capital between di¤erent establishments as evidence of
misallocation; their calculations imply that if capital and labor were hypothetically real-
located to equalize marginal products to the extent observed in the US, manufacturing
TFP would increase by 30-40% in China and by 40-60% in India. Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) explore the quantitative impact of policy distortions on aggregate productivity in
a stationary equilibrium with heterogeneous plants. They show that policy distortions
that create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers lead to misallocation
of resources across heterogeneous plants, and as a result can lead to sizable decreases in
output and measured TFP. However, di¤erently from my work, Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) focus their attention only on the steady-state distribution of rms and therefore are
silent about the impact of policy distortions on reallocation during economic downturns.
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Midrigan and Xu (2014) also study the impact of nancing frictions on misallocation and
focus in particular on two distinct channels: borrowing costs distorting the entry decision
of rms and borrowing costs distorting the allocation of capital among rms with di¤erent
productivities. They nd that only the rst channel is quantitively relevant. Compared
to my work, their main task is to explain cross-country di¤erences in TFP whereas I
focus my attention on the cyclical variation of TFP in the US economy during the recent
recession.
My paper also contributes to the literature exploring the impact of nancial shocks
on business cycle uctuations. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) document the behavior of
debt and equity nancing over the business cycle using aggregate data. They furthermore
develop a representative rm model in which investment is nanced using both debt and
equity and costs of adjusting dividends prevent the avoidance of paying nancial frictions.
Jermann and Quadrini nd that credit shocks have been an important source of business
cycles. However the representative rm setting that they employ prevents them from
studying the impact of nancial shocks on resource misallocation.
Perhaps the work closest to mine is Khan and Thomas (2013) who study the cyclical
implications of credit market imperfections in a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium
model in which rms are subject to two frictions: collateralized borrowing and partial
investment irreversibility. Collateral constraints limit the rms investment behaviour
and partial irreversibilities in investment lead rms to follow (S,s) rules with respect to
their capital. The presence of these real and nancial frictions slow down the reallocation
of capital across rms. Since reallocation is essential in determining aggregate TFP,
they show that a nancial crisis (originating as a sudden shock to the rmscollateral
constraint) can generate a large and protracted drop in aggregate TFP. Therefore the
drop in TFP following a nancial shock is endogenous because it is a consequence of the
change in the distribution of rms. They study the behavior of aggregate quantities after
a negative shock to borrowing conditions (in the spirit of Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011))
and nd that their model predicts aggregate changes resembling those from the 2007 US
recession. However they are not able to quantify the aggregate productivity loss due to
the impact of nancial frictions in the form of higher cost of external nance; indeed they
assume that the only source of external funds is debt, subject to a collateral constraint.
They hence rule the possibility of nancing investment by issuing new equity; however
it is important to include equity nance, Fama and French (2005) document that rms
frequently issue equity, and equity issuances are quantitatively important. Finally, another
recent paper investigating the link between credit market imperfections and misallocation
is Azariadis and Kaas (2012), who propose a sectoral-shift theory of TFP. They build a
model in which sectors are hit with di¤erent productivity shocks and limited enforcement
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in loans prevents reallocation of capital towards more productive sectors. The result is
that the level and growth of aggregate TFP is negatively correlated with the dispersion
of sectoral TFP growth rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the empirical
ndings regarding misallocation. In section 4 I set out the model and characterize the
optimal decision rules of the rms. In Section 5 I explain the calibration and simulation
of the model and in Section 6 I analyze the results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3 Measuring Misallocation over the Business Cycle
As discussed in the previous section, I look at the time variation of a cross-sectional
measure of allocative e¢ ciency (the Olley-Pakes gap) to assess the cyclical properties of
capital reallocation. Some empirical studies tend to conrm the procyclical nature of
reallocation (contrary to the cleansing view of recessions, in which more capital should
be liquidated in recessions). Among these, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) document that
ows of capital among rms decrease during downturns. In Figure 1 I plot the series for
reallocation using updated data to 2012. The authors dene capital reallocation as the
sum of acquisitions plus sales of PP&E (property, plant and equipment). Their measure
focuses hence only on instances when existing capital is sold or acquired but they are not
able to tell whether such transfers of ownership are productivity enhancing or not. In
other words, they are silent about the allocative e¢ ciency of capital.
As I argued above, a more informative way to measure reallocation of capital and to
assess whether it is productivity enhancing or not is to analyze the covariance of rm
level multifactor productivity and rm size. If the creative destruction theory were true,
this covariance should sharply increase during economic downturns, reecting the fact
that rms with productivity below the average become smaller since resources are shifted
away from them.
Production function estimates. The rst step in the computation of the OP covariance
term, dened as the second term in the right-hand side of equation (3), is the estimation of
the (log) rm-level total factor productivity, which requires the estimation of a production
function. Using the Compustat panel, I estimate the production function given by:
yit = 0 + 
k
jkit + 
l
jlit + zit + "it (4)
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where yit is the log of value added2 for rm i in period t, kit is the log of capital and lit is
the log of labor inputs. In the baseline exercise the input elasticities fk; lg are the same
for all sectors; as a robustness check I allow them to vary across 2-digit sectors, indexed
by j. The error term is composed by two parts: a pure shock "it that is not observed by
the rm nor by the econometrician and a productivity shock observed by the rm but
not by the econometrician. The most straightforward way to estimate (4) is by OLS.
However the problem with estimating a production function using OLS is that rms that
have a large productivity shock may respond by using more inputs, which would yield
biased estimates of the input coe¢ cients and hence biased measure of TFP (simultaneity
bias). Since traditional estimators used to overcome endogeneity issues (xed e¤ects,
instrumental variables) have not proven satisfactory for the case of production function,
a number of semiparametric alternatives have been proposed. Both Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) have developed a semiparametric estimator that
addresses the simultaneity bias. The key di¤erence between the two methods is that Olley
and Pakes (1996) use investment whereas Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use materials used
in production as a proxy for TFP. Since data on investment is readily available and often
non-zero at the rm level but data on materials is not, I follow Olley and Pakes (1996) to
estimate the production function. Once I estimate the production function parameters I
obtain the level TFP by
TFPit = exp (yit   b0   bkkit   bllit) (5)
In the estimation of (4) I use industry specic time dummies, hence my measure of tfp is
free of the e¤ect of industry or aggregate growth in any year.
Table 2 reports the estimates for the production function parameters and their stand-
ard errors using the entire sample period for manufacturing and non-manufacturing rms.
The results for all the rms combined, presented in the second column of the table indic-
ate a labor share of 0.74 and a capital share of 0.29. The estimates for the persistence and
conditional volatility of TFP (not reported in the table) are 0.69 and 0.30 respectively.
Validation of my TFP estimates. In order to gauge the sensibility of my TFP measure,
I contrast some of its properties with those obtained from studies that use longitudinal
micro-level datasets di¤erent from Compustat.
2Value added is dened as sales - materials, or, equivalentely, as operating income before depreci-
ation and amortization plus labor expenses. Unfortunately in COMPUSTAT only information about
the number of employees is available, therefore I approximate labor expenses by multiplying the number
of employees by average wages from Social Security Administration. See appendix for more on data
construction.
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Table 2: Production function parameters
lnreal_va (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All sample Manuf Non-manuf
lnlabor 0.736*** 0.824*** 0.699***
(0.00147) (0.00239) (0.00196)
lnreal_capital 0.292*** 0.213*** 0.330***
(0.00131) (0.00207) (0.00178)
Constant -2.653*** -2.827*** -2.582***
(0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0363)
Observations 204,158 108,199 95,959
R-squared 0.932 0.944 0.921
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total Factor Productivity
75th/25th 90th/10th
US Census 1.56 2.68
Compustat 1.47 2.41
Table 3: TFP Dispersion - Comparison
Please notice that labor has a higher coe¢ cient in the manufacturing subsample and
the opposite is true for the capital coe¢ cient. This is consistent with the ndings of
Foster et al. (2001) who examine manufacturing data and service sector data. There is
signicant dispersion in rm level TFPs. In an important contribution investigating the
productivity distribution in the US manufacturing sector, Syverson (2004) nds out that
the interquartile range (i.e. ratio between 75th and 25th percentile) of tfp is around 1.56;
moreover including more of the tails amplies the heterogeneity: the ratio between the
90th and the 10th percentile is as much high as 2.68. Using Compustat, I nd similar
results, as Table 3 summarizes. Another robust nding is that labor productivity is more
dispersed than total factor productivity. The interquartile range is 2.53 whereas the
90th/10th ratio is 7.28.
TFP dispersion and allocation e¢ ciency over time.
In Figure 2 I plot rm-level TFP dispersion, computed as follows. First I compute
total factor productivity by estimating the production function and taking the exponent
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of the predicted residuals (see equation (5)).
yit = 0 + kkit + llit + zit + "it
TFPit = exp (yit   b0   bkkit   bllit)
Then I dene TFP shocks (eit) as the residual from the following rst-order autoregressive
equation for rm-level log TFP:
log TFPit =  log TFPit 1 + t + eit
where t is a year xed e¤ect (to control for cyclical shocks). Since this residual will also
contain rm-level demand shocks that are not controlled for by 2-digit price deators, my
measure will combine both demand and technological shocks3.
Then I compute the cross-sectional standard deviation and the interquartile range
(IQR) of tfp shocks for each year across rms. Finally, I take a simple average across all
years in the sample. In Figure 2, I report the IQR since it is more robust to outliers,
however the results change little if I use the standard deviation.
In Figure 2, the blue shaded columns represent the share of quarters in recession within
a year. It is apparent the negative correlation between cross-sectional tfp dispersion and
gdp growth: interquartile range of TFP (IQR) spikes up during recessions, displaying a
clearly countercyclical behavior. The ndings delivered by Figure 2 conrm that dur-
ing recessions an increase in cross-sectional heterogeneity is observed, which means that,
ceteris paribus, there are more benets to reallocate resources to more productive rms.
The thesis of this paper is that instead during recessions frictions to capital liquidity
increase and this dampens a reallocation process between rms that would be otherwise
productivity enhancing. This is even more apparent from the Great Recession which has
been characterized by a huge nancial turmoil which greatly increased the cost of bor-
rowing for rms; this reduced access to market for equity to more productive and small
rms, dampening their growth and contributing to the fall in the covariance between
rm productivity and rm size. From Figure 3 it is possible to notice that such covari-
ance (Olley-Pakes gap) is generally procyclical and dropped the most in the 2007-2009
recession.
After estimating the total factor productivity series as I explained above, I compute
3This is a common feature of TFP estimates, since rm-level prices are very di¢ cult to obtain. A
relevant exception is Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008).
13
.3
.3
5
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Sh
ar
e 
of
 q
ua
rte
rs
 in
 re
ce
ss
io
n/
lo
w
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
TFP dispersion in recessions
Figure 2: TFP dispersion in recessions
Figure 3: Covariance between size and productivity
14
the output-weighted TFP for the rms in the Compustat panel:
TFPt =
X
i
!itzit
I decompose the change in TFP during the Great Recession following the methodology
of Olley and Pakes (1996) as the sum of unweighted component and a covariance term
between size and total factor productivity:
TFP2009:2007 = UNW2009:2007 +COV2009:2007
As I detailed above, the covariance between size and productivity is typically procyc-
lical; it is striking however that in the Great Recession an unprecedented drop in this
covariance term was observed. Since the Great Recession has been characterized by an
unprecedented contraction in nancing conditions, it is relevant to quantify the impact
of nancial frictions on the covariance term. In the real scenario I simulate the model
by feeding only the aggregate shock A. Notice that the unweighted term in the model is
given by
UNW = A
Z
exp (z) (dk; dz) = A
Z
exp (z)z (dz)
hence I calibrate the shock A so to reproduce exactly the drop in UNW . Result: the
aggregate shock A alone generates a small drop in COV . In the second scenario, on top
of the aggregate shock A, I add the nancial shock (modelled as a sudden and unexpected
increase in the cost of raising external nance). By construction the drop in UNW is the
same as before (and the same as what is observed in the data) but the drop in the COV
is much higher than in the "real shock only" case. Hence I claim that the contribution of
the nancial crisis to reallocation is given by:
COV (real+fin shock) COV (real shock):
Compustat vs Census of Manufacturers. A key advantage of using the Compustat
database is that I can decompose the change in allocative e¢ ciency over time across
both manufacturing and service, whereas previous studies that rely on the Longitudinal
Research Database, LRD (from the US Census of Manufacturers) were limited on the
manufacturing sector. Figure 4 and 5 plots the evolution of the share of manufacturing
in terms of sales and employment over time. Given the decreasing importance of the
manufacturing sector in terms of both output and employment, the advantage of a dataset
like Compustat that covers all the sectors (though only for listed rms) is clear.
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4 The Model
The aim is to use my model to infer the impact of nancial frictions on TFP through the
reallocation channel. I therefore need a model that contains the following features:
 Firms with heterogeneous productivity levels, to make reallocation of capital among
rms meaningful.
 Imperfect credit markets: I assume that in case rms want to raise additional funds
(in excess over operating cash ow) they need to pay an additional cost.
 Shock to aggregate TFP to generate the recession; for the sake of tractability I
model the negative aggregate shock to technology as a deterministic sequence that
is unforeseen by economic agents4.
4.1 Firms
I begin with describing the economic problem of the rms. Firms are ex-ante identical
and are subject to an exogenous TFP shock At that is common across all rms and
to an idiosyncratic productivity shocks denoted by zit5. Since in the data rm-level
productivity shocks show a high degree of persistence (as documented, among others, by
Foster et al. (2001) and Bloom et al. (2012)) I assume that these shocks are generated by
an autoregressive process with persistence :
log zit =  log zit 1 + "it (6)
where "it is distributed as a N (0; 2"). As it is standard in the literature I discretize the
continuous time process described in (6) as a rst-order Markov chain with transition
matrix Q using Tauchen (1986) procedure. I assume Pr fz0 = zjjz = zig = Qij  0 andP
j Qij = 1 for each i = 1; : : : ; Nz: The sequence of aggregate shocks At is known with
perfect foresight. Even though rms are ex-ante identical they di¤er ex-post since they
experience di¤erent histories of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
4The alternative way would be to introduce explicitely aggregate uncertainty in the model, along the
lines of Krusell and Smith (1996).
5The shocks zit could in principle capture any shock a¤ecting rms revenues, hence not only shocks
to technical e¢ ciency but also (idiosyncratic) demand shocks.
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Firms use capital and labor as factor inputs and produce output by operating a decreas-
ing returns to scale production function; the operating prot function (whose counterpart
in the data is cash ow from operations) is:
 (At; kit; zit) = max
lit0
fAtzitF (kit; lit)  wlitg (7)
Notice that  () is the operating prot function that is obtained after solving for the
static labor choice, therefore it is a function of k and the shocks only. Denoting by Iit the
investment made by rm i in year t, capital obeys the following law of motion
ki;t+1 = (1  ) kit + Iit;
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the depreciation rate. It is well-known that a model in which
it is costless to adjust the capital stock delivers a time series for investment rates that
is far too volatile; I therefore assume that the rm incurs quadratic adjustment costs
when investing. It is also well-know, since at least Caballero et al. (1995), that plant-level
investment is characterized by periods of inactivity followed by large spikes in investment;
while it is hard to match this type of evidence with a quadratic cost of adjustment, I
chose to adopt the quadratic specication for his computational tractability.
Firms can nance investment either with internal funds or borrowing from the nancial
market (by raising new equity or issuing debt). By raising external nance the rm incurs
a variety of additional costs going from otation costs to adverse selection premia. As in
Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited (2007) I do not model explicitly a setting with
asymmetric information but I attempt to capture the simple fact that external funds are
more costly than internal funds in a reduced form way. In particular, I assume that the
additional cost of raising external nance is given by
c (e) = 0 + 1  amount of external funds
In other words there is a xed cost 0 and a per unit cost 1 associated with external
nance. A large body of empirical research provides detailed evidence regarding under-
writing fees (see, among others, Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)) nding that there are
signicant economies of scale: this is why a cost function with decreasing average cost
seems most appropriate. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) use a slightly di¤erent formulation
which omits the xed cost. However the xed cost formulation is needed in my framework
in order (i) to rationalize the presence of economies of scale and (ii) to match the degree
of nancial inaction that I documented in the Compustat sample (see Table 1).
The rm problem is to choose investment and nancial policy to maximize net pay-
19
ments to its shareholders6, taking as given the real interest rate and the wage rate:
V (k; z) = max
d;e;I;k0
(
d  e  c (e) + 1
1 + r
X
z0
V (k0; z0)Q (z0jz)
)
(8)
s.t.
d+ I +
 
2
I2
k
=  (k; z; A) + e; (9)
k0 = (1  ) k + I; (10)
c (e) = (0 + 1e) 1fe>0g; (11)
d  0; (12)
e  0: (13)
Equation (9) describes the ow of funds condition for the rm. The sources of funds
(on the right-hand side) consists of operating cash-ows , and external funds, e. The
uses of funds (on the left-hand side) consist of capital expenditures, adjustment costs
and dividend payments. Please notice that in this setting the only way rms can save
is by accumulating capital: I choose to rule out rm savings in cash holdings or other
nancial assets. Adding nancial savings or debt would make the problem more realistic
but would also increase considerably the computational burden: with the additional debt
choice there is a cross-sectional distribution of rms over three states capital, debt and
idiosyncratic productivity (k; b; z) that is more di¢ cult to handle with7.
Equation (11) describes the external nance cost function: these costs are positive and
increasing if the rm uses external funds. If no external funds are required, these costs
are zero. This formulation is consistent with the Pecking Order Hypothesis (Myers and
Majluf (1984)): rms rst use internal nance and if they do not have enough, then issue
debt, and as a last resort equity. The pecking order hypothesis can account for the stylized
facts that retentions and then debt are the primary sources of nance. Notice furthermore
that it is never optimal to raise external nance and at the same time distribute dividends.
Indeed
Lemma 1 It is never optimal for the rm to choose e > 0 and d > 0.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the rms chooses e > 0 and d > 0. Then the rm
can decrease both e and d by a small amount " > 0, which induce a change in prots given
by 1" > 0
6See appendix D for a derivation of the optimal value maximization problem of the rm.
7However, Im currently working on an extension to incorporate debt into the rms problem.
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4.2 Household
Since I am mainly interested in reallocation of capital among rms with heterogeneous
productivities, on the households side I can focus on a representative agent formulation.
The representative agent has preferences over consumption and labor that are summarized
by the following utility function
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Nt) (14)
Households income comes from wages and dividends. In order to write its budget
constraint, I must aggregate all rm-level quantities. To this end, let me dene t as
the cross sectional distribution of rms over the individual state (k; z) in period t. The
budget constraint can then be stated as:
Ct+
Z
Ptt+1 (k; z)t (dk; dz)+bt+1 (1 + rt) bt = wtNt+
Z
(dt + Pt   et   c (et)) t (k; z)t (dk; dz)
(15)
where t denotes the shares owned by household, bt denotes bond holdings. In equilibrium
t = 1 and bt = 0 for all t since all households are equal.
The representative households problem is to maximize (14) subject to (15). The rst-
order conditions with respect to labor supply Nt and bond holdings bt+1 are respectively:
 Un (Ct; Nt)
Uc (Ct; Nt)
= wt;
Uc (Ct; Nt) = Uc (Ct+1; Nt+1) (1 + rt+1) :
Since I consider the model in the stationary equilibrium with interest rate rt, wage rate
wt and aggregate quantities constant over time, the households problem can be simplied
in this following static problem:
max
C;N
U (C;N)
s.t.
C = wN +
Z
d (k; z;w) d (k; z) 
Z
e (k; z;w) d (k; z) 
Z
c (e (k; z;w)) d (k; z) (16)
This is a standard concave problem with interior solutions. In the steady state the Euler
equation pins down the interest rate as
r =
1

  1 (17)
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and optimality condition with respect to labor supply becomes:
  Un (C;N)
Uc (C;N)
= w (18)
Solving the households problem I get the households decision rules for consumption
C (w;) and labor supply Ls (w;) :
4.3 Stationary distribution and Aggregation
Assuming At constant, the solution to the rms optimization problem (8) delivers the
policy functions
k0 = g (k; z) ; I (k; z) ; l (k; z) ; y (k; z) ; e (k; z)
mapping the rms state variables k and z into the rms current choices (please notice
that for simplicity I omit the dependence of the policy functions upon the wage w). The
vector of individual state variables x = (k; z) lies in X = [0;1)  Z, where Z is the
discrete set for productivity shocks z, i.e. Z = fz1; z1; : : : ; znzg. Let B be the associated
Borel  algebra. For any set B 2 B,  (B) is the mass of rms whose individual states
lie in the set B. The transition function T (x;B) denes the probability that a rm in
state x = (k; z) will have a state lying in B in the next period, given the decision rule g
for next-period capital. I can dene each set B as the Cartesian product BK BZ ; then
the transition function T : X  B![0; 1] can be written as:
T ((k; z) ; BK BZ) =
( P
z02BZ Q (z; z
0) if g (k; z) 2 BK
0 otherwise
where g (k; z) is the policy function for next-period capital. Given the transition function,
I can dene the probability measure  as
0 (B) =
Z
X
T (x;B) (dx) (19)
Given the invariant distribution  (k; z) =  = 0; I can compute the aggregate
variables:
 Aggregate investment:
I (w;) =
Z
I (k; k0 (k; z) ;w) (dk; dz)
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 Aggregate labor demand:
Ld (w;) =
Z
l (k; z;w) (dk; dz)
 Aggregate output supply:
Y (w;) =
Z
y (k; z;w) (dk; dz)
 Aggregate adjustment costs:
AC (w;) =
Z

2
I (k; z;w)2
k
 (dk; dz)
 Aggregate external nance costs:
E (w;) =
Z
c (e (k; z)) (dk; dz)
Now I give the denition of equilibrium in my model, focusing for simplicity on the
steady-state.
Denition 2 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a list of value function V ,
policy functions, invariant measure  and prices r; w such that:
(1) Given the prices fr; wg, the policy functions d (k; z) ; e (k; z) ; I (k; z) ; k0 (k; z)
solve the optimization problem of the rm in (8)
(2) Factor prices (r; w) are determined by equations (17) and (18)
(3) Markets clear; in particular in the labor market supply equals demand:
N s (w;) =
Z
x=(k;z)
l (k; z) (dk; dz) (20)
and the good market clears:
C (w;) + I (w;) + AC (w;) + E (w;) = Y (w;)
where the term E (w;) represents aggregate costs of raising external nance. Of course
by Walraslaw this last resource constraint is redundant8: it is implied by combining the
rms ow of funds constraint (9) with the households budget constraint (16).
8Indeed I dont use it when computing the equilibrium but I verify ex-post that it is satised.
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4.4 Economic mechanism
Before reporting the results from the simulation, it is useful to look at the steady state
distribution. Firms can be in three di¤erent nance regimes (this why heterogeneity is
important)
1. d = 0, e > 0: external nance regime
2. d = 0, e = 0: nancial inactivity regime
3. d > 0, e = 0: dividend distribution regime
Figure 6 illustrates these regimes for the baseline model and reveals a few interesting
features. First, rms that are either very small or very productive tap the nancial market
and do not distribute dividends (top-left region: high z and low k; remember that z and
k are the rms state variables). These rms are in the external nance regime. Second,
rms that are either very large or less productive use internal funds to nance investment
and also distribute dividends (bottom-right region: low z and high k). They are in the
dividend distribution regime. Finally the remaining rms do not distribute dividends
and do not raise external nance. They are in the nancial inactivity regime. Figure 9
conrms this.
Figure 7 depicts the policy function for external nance, e (k; z). It conrms that large
rms, with a high capital stock, generate enough internal cash ow and do not need to
raise additional resources from banks or from the equity market. In particular, there exists
a capital threshold k (z) such that only rms with k < k (z) choose a strictly positive value
of e; interestingly, such threshold is increasing with respect to productivity: holding the
size of the rm xed, rms that are hit by higher productivity shocks are more likely to
raise external nance. This policy rule for external nance shows an inverted U-shape
form when external nance is positive. In this model, external nance is a double-edged
sword. For a given productivity, a rm needs to borrow to invest and this increases
their expected prots. On the other hand, this also increases the cost related to external
nance. The policy function reects these two opposing tendencies creating the inverted
U-shape that we observe. Higher values of z increase the future prots, allowing the rm
to borrow larger amounts and shift the policy rule up.
Figure 8 plots instead the policy function for dividends d (k; z): small rms tend
not to distribute dividends since they need to use all their internal cash ow to nance
investment, and this e¤ect is of course more pronounced for higher productivity rms.
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5 Calibration and Quantitative Results
I assume that a time period corresponds to one year. I calibrate the baseline model to
match some moments obtained from Compustat. The Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD), a large panel dataset of U.S. manufacturing plants developed by the U.S. Bureau
of the Census, is another dataset that is widely used in productivity and reallocation
studies. One major shortcoming of the LRD for my purposes is that it lacks detailed
data on rms nancing choices such as equity issuances, debt, interest expenses, etc.
Another shortcoming of the LRD is that it is strictly limited to manufacturing establish-
ments; hence the non-manufacturing sector, which is getting more important over time,
is not represented at the LRD (see also discussion in section 3). Consequently I consider
Compustat a better choice.
The sample period ranges from 1980 to 2006 which corresponds roughly to the Great
Moderation period, before the 2007 recession started. The table below describes the
calibration in the baseline scenario (i.e. steady state before the recession)
Parameter Symbol Calibration target
Exponent on capital k TFP process
Exponent on labor l TFP process
Depreciation rate  Average I=K
Discount factor  Interest rate 4%
Weight on leisure h time spent on market work
Adjustment cost  std I=K
Shock persistence  TFP process
Shock standard deviation " TFP process
Fixed cost 0 share rms e > 0
Marginal cost 1 share rms e > 0
Table 4: CALIBRATION
Preferences. Regarding the consumers side of the economy, as I explained above it is
highly stylized (representative agent) since I am mainly interested in rm dynamics. As
per-period utility I choose the following functional form:
u (C;N) = logC   h
2
N2
where h is the weight on leisure. This utility function has a unit Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, which is reasonable for macro models as argued by Hall (2005). I choose
the discount factor  such that the interest rate is equal to 4% using equation (17). I
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choose the parameter h to match the equilibrium labor supply of 0:3, which is the average
fraction of time spent on market work.
Technology. I assume rms operate a Cobb-Douglas production function with decreas-
ing returns to scale
yit = AtF (zit; kit; nit) = Atzitk
k
it n
l
it
with 0 < k + l < 1. Productivity shock follows the process
log zit =  log zit 1 + "it
where "it is independently and identically distributed and normally distributed with mean
0 and variance 2". The procedure for calibrating the parameter values k, l;  and 
exploits the micro level information on rms technology provided by Compustat. As
I explained in section 3 of my paper I estimate the following Cobb-Douglas production
function in logarithms:
yit = 0 + jkkit + jllit + zit + "it
allowing the factor elasticities to vary across 2-digit industries (as usual the index i refers
to the rms whereas the index j refers to the sector). Then I consider the median across
sectors of the jk and I set the capital coe¢ cient in the model equal to this value. I
do the same for the labor coe¢ cient l. This procedure delivers a coe¢ cient for capital
k = 0:311 and a coe¢ cient for labor l = 0:65. Interestingly the micro data do not reject
the hypothesis of decreasing returns to scale.
To calibrate the persistence and the standard deviation of the stochastic process for
idiosyncratic TFP shocks I rst compute TFP in levels from the residual of the estimated
equation:
log TFPit = exp (yit   b0   bkkit   bllit)
Then I t a rst-order autoregressive process to log TFPit
log TFPit =  log TFPit 1 + eit;
where eit is independently and identically distributed across i and t, and drawn from a
standard normal distribution. These estimates imply that the parameters of the shock
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process z in the model are
b = 0:742b = 0:275
It is useful to contrast these estimates for the productivity process with the study of Abra-
ham and White (2006) who employ Census data. Their results imply that the persistence
of rm-level shocks is surprisingly low: b is only 0.37, whereas the standard deviation of
the shock is 0.397 (Table 1 in their paper). This striking di¤erence can be partly due
to the di¤erent size of rms (rms in Compustat are typically bigger than rms in the
Census) and to the fact that I consider all sectors in the economy (excluding only nancial
and government) whereas they can analyze only the manufacturing.
Another possible concern regarding my calibration is the non-standard choice for the
Cobb-Douglas parameters k and l. Typically in the macro literature these parameters
are calibrated to match the average labor share in aggregate data; however I nd more
reasonable to use micro-level estimates, since I do not have a representative rm with an
aggregate production function in my model. The average labor share in my model implied
by my calibration is 0.54 which is not too far from what reported in the real business cycle
literature.
The nal parameter to be calibrated is the adjustment cost parameter  . Because the
volatility of the investment rate is very sensitive to this parameter, I choose a value to
match the cross-sectional volatility of the investment rate in my data, which is around
0.16. More specically, for any given value of  , I solve the model numerically and
obtain the stationary distribution of rms. Using this stationary distribution, I compute
the cross-sectional standard deviation of the investment rate in the model. Without
adjustment cost, my model would imply excessive sensitivity of investment to variations
in productivity shocks, which is inconsistent with empirical evidence. My calibrated value
of  is close to the value reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), who estimate it
using indirect inference.
Financing costs. The external cost function
c (e) = (0 + 1e) 1fe>0g
is meant to capture the basic notion that external funds are more costly than internal
ones. Broadly speaking, there are two types of costs associated with external nance:
(i) informational costs and (ii) transaction costs. Informational costs are related to the
bad signal the rm may transmit to the market when trying to raise funds (see agency
cost theories, Myers and Majluf (1984)) but these are very hard to quantify. Transaction
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costs are given by compensation to intermediaries, legal and accounting costs associated
to debt or equity issuance.
In order to calibrate the parameters of this external cost function, I need to construct
an empirical measure of a rms external nancing needs. The aim is to choose 0 and 1
so that the model moments referring to external nance closely match the corresponding
statistic computed from the data.
Consider the ow budget constraint of a rm in my model:
dit   eit =  (kit; zit)  Iit    
2
I2it
k
; (21)
where the left hand side represents the net nancial ow out of the rm (if positive) or into
the rm (if negative). If the right-hand side of (21) is positive, so that the rmss capital
expenditure is less than the cash-ow generated by the rm in t, then funds ow out of
the rm. In this case the rm is distributing dividends to its shareholders. Conversely,
if the right-hand side of (21) is negative, then the rms investment needs exceeds the
available cash-ow, which means that funds ow into the rm. Then the rm is raising
external funds, i.e. eit is positive. Let me dene the following two statistics:
 Xit: capital expenditures.
 AFit: available funds. These are cash ow from operations net from interest pay-
ments.
Here I follow the standard approach in the literature on external nance dependence
(see, among others, Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Since my model does not distinguish
between investment in existing assets or acquisition of new assets, I compute the measure
of investment as: Xit= capital expenditures + acquisition - sale of PPE (property, plant
and equipment).
To compute available funds I have two possibilities: (1) Available Funds = Operating
activities - net cash ow (OANCF) or Funds from operations (FOPT). (2) Available Funds
= Income before extraordinary items (IBC) + depreciation and amortization (DPC). Both
methods yield similar results. Then I can compute the share of rms raising external
nance in year t as the number of rms whose investment is greater then their available
funds in year t over the total number of rms in t:PNt
i=1 1fXit>AFitg
Nt
: (22)
I can also compute the fraction of investment that must be nanced externally in year t
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Figure 10: External Finance Flows
Parameter value Calibration target Data moment
0 0.10 Share of rms with e > 0 0.36
1 0.28 Ext n / investment 0.21
Table 5: Steady-state Calibration
as: PNt
i=1 (Xit   AFit) 1fXit>AFitgPNt
i=1Xit
: (23)
In Figure 10 I plot the evolution of (22) and (23) over time.
Calibration of cost function
I summarize the calibration in Table 5. The two moments reported in the table are
computed taking the average of (22) and (23) across the years from 1980 to 2007; they
are meant to capture the average nancing needs of rm in the steady state before the
Great Recession broke out.
Note: when you read in the table that the external nance over investment ratio is 0.21
it means that on average 21% of investment undertaken by rms is nanced externally
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Calibration target Average 1980-2007 value in 2007 value in 2009
Share of rms with e > 0 0.36 0.39 0.30
Ext n / investment 0.21 0.37 0.19
Table 6: Before and After the recession, Calibration
(average across years). Please notice that this value is consistent with the empirical
ndings of Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2012).
As I discussed in the introduction, to simulate the impact of the Great Recession on
rms nancing environment I set the parameters of the cost function to match the share of
rms raising external nance after the Great Recession hit the economy. As it is apparent
from Figure (10) during the GR it became more di¢ cult for rms to access credit: indeed
the share of rms accessing outside nancing dropped from 39% in 2007 to 30% in 2009.
Moreover the fraction of investment nanced with external funds dropped from 37% in
2007 to 19% in 2009 (see Figure 10 or Table 6).
6 Results
6.1 Steady State
In Table 7 I report the moments of the rm dynamics generated by the model and compare
them with the corresponding data from Compustat. I report in italics the moments that
are a calibration target, where the match is exact by construction. As I explained in the
previous section, I chose the depreciation parameter  to match the aggregate investment
ratio and the adjustment cost parameter  to match the volatility of the investment
rate. For the other quantities, one can see that my model matches most cross-sectional
moments reasonably well. In particular the model slightly overpredicts the autocorrelation
of the investment rate that is observed in the data sample and slightly overpredicts the
covariance between rm size and rm productivity.
Considering the nancing regimes for the rms in the cross-section, the model by con-
struction matches the shares of rms whose capital expenditures are larger than internal
funds; however it generates more rms distributing dividends and less rms inactive than
what is observed in the data.
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Variable Data Model
Average I=K 0.17 0.17
std I=K 0.156 0.156
Autocorr. of I=K 0.596 0.64
Cov(!,z) 0.438 0.534
External Finance 0.36 0.36
Financial Inactivity 0.213 0.147
Dividend distrib. 0.426 0.493
Table 7: Data vs Model, Results
6.2 Great Recession Simulation
As I discussed in section 3, I decompose the total factor productivity index for rms in
Compustat as the sum of an unweighted component and a covariance component, following
the methodology pioneered by Olley and Pakes (1996) and reprised by Bartelsman et al.
(2013):
TFPt =
X
i
!itzit = zt +
X
i
(!it   !t) (zit   zt) (24)
where zt and !t represent unweighted mean productivity and unweighted mean share,
respectively. This decomposition is useful to understand if the Great Recession impacted
more on the productivity of the average rm or on the covariance between size and pro-
ductivity. As documented in the rst row of Table 8, the output-weighted total factor
productivity decreased by 1.97% from 2007 to 2009; of such drop the unweighted term
accounted for -0.93% and the covariance for -1.04%. Remember that the lower this cov-
ariance, the lower is the share of output that goes to more productive rms and the lower
is the weighted productivity. But what is the contribution of the worsening in credit
conditions on this covariance, which measures the allocative e¢ ciency in the distribution
of production factors across rms? I can evaluate this contribution by simulating the
counterfactual scenario of a real recession only using my model.
The production function equation in the model is given by:
yit = Atzitk
k
it l
l
it
Hence total factor productivity in logs is equal to:
TFPit = Atzit
and it is the product of an aggregate shock times a rm-level idiosyncratic shock. The
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% TFP % unweighted % Cov(kit,zit)
Data (Compustat) -1.97 -0.93 -1.04
(I) Real shock -1.095 -0.93 -0.165B
(II) Real and n shock -1.79 -0.93 -0.86A
Table 8: Data and Counterfactual Exercise
output-weighted TFP, which is the model counterpart of (24) is:
TFP = A
Z
z  ! (k; z) (dk; dz) = A  E (z) + A  COV (z; !)
where ! (k; z) is the output weight of a rm with capital k and idiosyncratic productivity
z:
! (k; z) =
y (k; z)R
y (k; z) (dk; dz)
This share is the model counterpart of !it in equation (24). The Great Recession had a
negative impact both on the technological term and on the allocative e¢ ciency term. I
calibrate the aggregate shock to reproduce exactly the observed drop in the unweighted
term.
In the rst scenario I hit the economy with a real shock only. From the table it is
evident that a recession driven by a real aggregate shock only have a modest impact on
the cross-sectional e¢ ciency in the allocation of factors. A nancial recession, as captured
by the second exercise, instead, has a much larger impact on the covariance term. As in
a di¤-in-di¤ strategy, I can recover the contribution of nancial frictions to the variation
in the covariance by taking the di¤erence between the two cells A and B in the table. In
other words the impact of the nancial shock on the cross-sectional e¢ ciency of resources
is
Cov(real+n shock)-Cov(real)
=   0:86  ( 0:165) =  0:695
The main channel through which the increase in nancial cost a¤ects the covariance term
is that it changes the distribution of rms across the three di¤erent nancing regimes.
The picture below show the partition of the state space into the 3 nancing regimes
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The nancing costs are calibrated so that the share of rms in the external nance
regime is roughly equal to the corresponding share in the data. In exercise I, when only
the real aggregate shock hits the economy, the new distribution is
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In exercise II, when also the nancial shock hits the economy, the new distribution is:
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% TFP % unweighted % Cov(kit,zit)
Data (Compustat) -1.97 -0.93 -1.04
(I) Real shock -1.67 -0.93 -0.74
(II) Real and n shock -5.19 -0.93 -4.26
Table 9: Data and Counterfactual Exercise - Partial Equilibrium
Much less rms can access now external nance; but those rms who were access-
ing external nance were the most productive. Therefore the nancial shock causes a
reallocation of productive inputs from high to low productivity rms, decreasing the
cross-sectional e¢ ciency, as captured by the covariance term.
General Equilibrium E¤ect. Since my model is cast in general equilibrium, it is insight-
ful to conduct the hypothetical experiment of shutting down the price feedback mechan-
ism. Specically, I x the wage rate at its level in the steady state before the recession.
At this wage I use labor demand to determine aggregate employment by ignoring the
labor market-clearing condition (20). After solving the rms problem, I derive aggregate
investment and aggregate output. I then use the resource constraint to solve for aggregate
consumption. The prot function of the rm, under the parametric assumptions described
in section 5, is:
 (A; k; z;w) = (1  l)
l
w
 l
1 l A (zkk)
1
1 l
The above equation reveals that the lower wage increases the rmsprots and its
return to investment. Moreover, since  also represents operating sales net of labor
payments9, a lower wage increases the rms internal cash ows. This equilibrium price
feedback e¤ect dampens the decrease in investment among rms that are raising external
nance and hence the drop in the covariance between size and productivity is smaller
in general equilibrium. Table 9 reports the results from the simulations in the partial
equilibrium, i.e. the changes in the total factor productivity that I would observe if
the wage stayed constant at the level before the recession. In particular the decrease in
the covariance between size and productivity is about 4/5 times larger than in general
equilibrium.
To sum up, my numerical experiment demonstrates that performing counterfactuals
in partial equilibrium can have potentially misleading outcomes.
9Indeed  (k; z) = maxl fzy (k; l)  wlg.
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7 Conclusions
In this work I document that in the Compustat dataset (representative sample of listed
rms in the US) a signicant part of the drop in total factor productivity observed during
the Great Recession can be attributed to a decrease in the allocative e¢ ciency of capital
among rms (rather than to a technological e¤ect common to all rms). Indeed the de-
crease in the covariance between size and productivity (a measure of allocative e¢ ciency)
is 1.04 percent out of roughly 2 percent decline in total factor productivity. The use of
Compustat improves upon previous studies for at least two reasons. First the service
sector, extensively represented in Compustat, has become increasingly important in the
recent years; second while Compustat does not cover small rms (as long as small rms
are not listed rms) it o¤ers a very thorough description of large rms that account of
more than 50 percent of total GDP and more than 30 percent of total employment in the
US economy.
The empirical nding that the allocative e¢ ciency of resources among rms worsens
during economic downturns sharply contrasts with the cleansing view of recessions: ac-
cording to this theory, that dates back at least to Schumpeter10, recessions should be
times of enhanced reallocation. Since during economic downturns the dispersion in prot
growth rates increases (as documented by Eisfeldt and Rampini 2006) there are more bene-
ts of reallocating capital from less to more productive plants; moreover during recessions
the opportunity cost of resources are typically low (plants are underutilized); these ob-
servations should imply that recessions are times of accelerated productivity enhancing
reallocation. However in the Great Recession nancial conditions worsened and hence the
increase in credit market frictions could have had a negative impact on reallocation. In
particular during the Great Recession, reallocation of productive inputs was driven more
by frictions in credit markets than by economic fundamentals such as productivity.
With the help of a model with heterogeneous rms I nd out that the distribution
of rms among nancing regime is a crucial determinant of this covariance. Since in the
data I see that the 2007-2009 period witnessed a large drop in the rms raising funds
from nancial market, I relate the increase in the cost of external nancing to the mis-
allocation of resources among rms. In the model a reduced-form cost function captures
the basic notion than external funds are more costly than internally generated cash-ow.
The increase in the cost of external nance a¤ects most rms that are small and highly
productive; these rms are growing and are giving a positive contribution to the covari-
ance term. In order to assess the contribution of nancial conditions to the covariance I
simulate a counterfactual recession where the economy is hit by a technological worsening
10The rst formalization of the creative destruction theory is by Aghion and Howitt (1992).
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only; by construction this shock to the average total factor productivity matches exactly
the drop in the unweighted tfp.
To summarize the two critical implications from my study are the following:
(i) variations in measured total factor productivity are only to a small extent variation
in the productivity of the average rm. The main part is attributable to a reallocation of
market shares between rms with heterogeneous productivity levels.
(ii) The extent to which more productive rms also enjoy a larger market share crit-
ically depends on the easiness in accessing nancial markets to get external funds for
investment.
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A Data Appendix
How to construct investment rates
Since rms record capital stock at book value rather than the more useful economic
concept which is replacement value, I use perpetual inventory model (as described in
Salinger and Summers 1983 and Gomes 2001) to convert book value of capital into re-
placement value for every rm-year. First, I set the replacement value of the initial capital
stock equal to the book value of gross PPE for the rst year that the rm shows up in
Compustat. Then I estimate the useful life of capital goods in any year using the formula
Li;t =
Bki;t 1 + Ii;t
Depri;t
where Depri;t is the reported value of depreciation and amortization, and take the time
average of Lit, which I call Li. Finally I compute the series for the capital stock kit (in
market value terms) iterating on the following recursive formula:
ki;t =

ki;t 1
Pt
Pt 1
+ Ii;t

1  2
Li

for t = 1; 2; ::, where Pt is deator for non-residential investment. and Li is the time
average of Li;t.
Derivation of the Olley-Pakes decomposition
The decomposition proposed by Olley and Pakes (equation 3 in the main text) follows
after some algebra:
TFPt =
X
i
!itTFPit
=
X
i
(!t + !it   !t)
 
TFP t + TFPit   TFP t

= Nt!tTFP t +
X
i
(!it   !t)
 
TFPit   TFP t

= TFP t +
X
i
(!it   !t)
 
TFPit   TFP t

where TFP t = 1Nt
P
i TFPit; where Nt is the number of active rms in period t.
Output weighted TFP in the model
 Let  (k; z) denote the stationary distribution of rms over capital and productivity
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 The output-weighted productivity in the model is computed as:
TFP =
Z
z
Z
k
! (k; z) ez
where
! (k; z)  y (k; z) (k; z)R
z
R
k
y (k; z) d (k; z)
B Computation - Steady State
The algorithm follows Aiyagari(1994) and Huggett(1993). I start by guessing a value
for the wage w. For the given wage I solve the rms decision problem by value function
iteration on a discrete grid. Then I compute the invariant distribution of rms over capital
and productivity. As a last step I check whether the labor market equilibrium condition
holds. If not, I update the wage.
More in detail:
 Step 1 - Make a guess for equilibrium wage w:
 Step 2 - Given w, solve the rms problem by value function iteration on a discrete
grid. Even if slow, it is the most robust method (better to use this because policy
functions are non linear due to the xed equity cost). Get policy function k0 =
g (k; z) and the other decision rules.
 Step 3 - Using the policy function g (k; z) computed in step 2 and the exogenous
Markov chain for productivity shocks, compute the invariant distribution  (k; z)
by iterating on (19)
 Step 4 - Using the stationary distribution  (k; z) obtained in step 3, compute
aggregate labor demand Nd (w) =
P
k;z n (k; z)
 (k; z). Then check if equation
 Un
 
C;Nd (w)

Uc (C;Nd (w))
= w
is satised11. If it is, stop; otherwise update the wage and go back to step 2.
11The function  Un(C;N
d(w))
Uc(C;Nd(w))
  w = 0 is not perfectly continuous given the discretized nature of the
algorithm, and it is therefore not always possible to compute a clearing wage level to an arbitrary level
of precision. However the problem is generally well-behaved with a tolerance level of 10 7 in the baseline
simulation.
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An alternative way is to compute explicitly the excess demand function for labor:
Nd  N s.
 Iterate until convergence.
C Computation - Transition
I describe the algorithm for a transitory shock (i.e. the initial and the nal steady state
are equal).
1. Compute steady state
2. Make a guess for the wage and the interest rate path along the transition:

roldt ; w
old
t
	T
t=1
.
A good guess is rss; wss
3. Solve the rms problem by backward induction, starting with VT = V ss. Compute
policy functions fg (k; z)gt for t = T   1; T   2; ::; 1
4. Using the exogenous Markov chain and the time-varying policy functions computed
in the previous step, iterate forward the distribution starting from 1 = 
ss :
t+1 (k
0; z0) =
X
k
X
z
(z; z0) 1fk:g(k;z)=k0gt (k; z)
5. Using fgTt=1 and fg (k; z)gTt=1 compute aggregate variables Ct; Nt; Yt for each time
t
6. Get new sequence of wage and interest rates fw0t; r0tg from the households rst order
conditions:
w0t =  
Un
 
Ct; N
d
t

Uc
 
Ct; Ndt

r0t =
Uc (Ct; Nt)
Uc (Ct+1; Nt+1)
If maxt
jroldt   r0tj+ jwoldt   w0tj	 is less than a precision threshold, stop. Otherwise
update the prices sequences in this way:
wnewt = w
0
t + (1  )woldt ;
rnewt = r
0
t + (1  ) roldt
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and go back to step 2.
D Firms value problem
Consider the representative households maximization problem which I re-write below for
convenience: 1X
t=0
tU (Ct; Nt) (25)
s.t.
Ct +
Z
Ptt+1dt + bt+1   (1 + rt) bt = wtNt +
Z
(dt + Pt   et   c (et)) tdt (26)
The rst-order conditions with respect to bond bt+1 and share holdings t+1 are:
U1 (Ct; Nt) =  (1 + rt+1)U1 (Ct+1; Nt+1)
12
and
U1 (Ct; Nt)Pt = U1 (Ct+1; Nt+1)Et fdt+1 + Pt+1   et+1   c (et+1)g
Hence combining the two equations I get the result that the required rate on return on
equity must be equal to the real interest rate (in other words, there is no risk premium).
(1 + rt+1) =
Et fdt+1 + Pt+1   et+1   c (et+1)g
Pt
:
or,
Pt =

1
1 + rt+1

Et fdt+1 + Pt+1   et+1   c (et+1)g
Iterating forward yields
Pt =
1X
n=1
nY
j=1

1
1 + rt+j

Et fdt+1   et+1   c (et+1)g
which corresponds to (??) or (8).
12Along the transition aggregate variables and prices are deterministic sequences, hence I do not need
the expectation operator.
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E An alternative formulation of the rms problem
An alternative formulation of the rms problem is the following13:
V (k; z) = max
k00;I
(
 (k; z)  I    
2
I2
k
  01
n
I +  
2
I2
k
>  (k; z)
o
  1max
n
I +  
2
I2
k
   (k; z) ; 0
o
+ 1
1+r
Ez0jzV (k0; z0)
)
s.t.
k0 = (1  ) k + I;
where 1 fg is an indicator function. The term in brackets is the sum of current net cash
ow and expected discounted continuation value; net cash ow is current prots minus
investment spending and nancing costs. If current prots are lower than desired capital
expenditures then the rm has to pay an additional cost (both xed and linear). To see
the equivalence with (8) it is useful to dene the auxiliary variable e:
e = max

I +
 
2
I2
k
   (k; z) ; 0

The term I +  
2
I2
k
  , if positive, represents the amount of external nance raised by the
rm. As it is explained in the main text, the cost function captures the basic fact that
external funds are more costly than internal funds.
13I would like to thank Matthias Messner for suggesting this equivalent formulation
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